Business Aviation Security

Tuesday, 24 March 2015 | 8:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

PRESENTED BY:
Charlie LeBlanc
Matt Burdette
Greg Kulis
Tom Sloan
Security Threat Assessment

Tuesday, 24 March 2015 | 8:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

PRESENTED BY:
Matt Burdette – Chief of Intelligence
UnitedHealthcare Global Risk
Security & Trip Planning

Security’s place in the planning process

• Where does security fit best for you?
• Importance is consistent integration
• Evolving process over time leads to adaptation and improvement but requires consistent dedication & honest feedback
Security & Trip Planning

Threat x Vulnerability = Risk (T \times V = R)

• Understanding and evaluating threats = Threat Assessment
• Process and products vary between companies and vendors
• Mix of quantitative and qualitative options available and used by many flight departments and companies
• Having a process, and dedicating reliable resources to that process is more important than a one-time effort
Identifying the threats

Terrorism

• Easy current examples: Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria Lebanon
• Less obvious examples: Egypt & Turkey
• Tricky examples: France & Belgium
• Occam’s Security Corollary: Dramatic doesn’t mean likely…
Threat Assessment

Low Level / High Volume Threats

• High petty crime rate locations: Lagos, Rio, Lima
• Common youth pickpocket gangs: St. Petersburg
• Trends in armed robbery & assaults: Sao Paulo, Johannesburg
• Express kidnappings: Mexico & Brazil
• Importance of cultural knowledge – shows familiarity, don’t stand out
Threat Assessment

Medium Level / Medium Volume Threats

• Primarily Demonstrations & Domestic Unrest – Differences home & abroad
• Small issues can escalate rapidly
  – Lebanon – aftermath of car bomb assassination of Rafik Hariri (Feb 2005)
  – China – Tiananmen Square (June 1989) Unusual extreme example
  – Brazil – Confederations Cup riots & unrest (June 2013)
Threat Assessment

High Level / Low Volume Threats

• High level – not just the immediate area but broad reach (Large area effect)
  – Major military actions; Insurgent/Terrorist group sustained activities
    • Iraq, Yemen, Nigeria, Ukraine
• Complacency just as much a risk here as with low level threats
• Situations may be known in advance but not always the case
  – Development can be both rapid and gradual but the latter does not diminish the threat
    and the net effects of gradual escalation can have a greater impact than the fast ones
Threat Assessment
Ukraine, Russia & Crimea

• Relatively rapid escalation with respect to the scale & effects
• Crisis originated from history, nationalist sentiment and political developments
• A decade of buildup: 2004’s Orange Revolution to 2014’s ousting of Yanukovych
  – West vs. East: European option vs. Putin’s Vision
• Protests erupt in November 2013 and then continue into 2014
• February 20th: 88 People killed in Kiev in protester/security clashes
• Stage set & Fuse lit
Threat Assessment

Ukraine, Russia & Crimea

• Eastern provinces react with demonstrations
• Almost immediately uncertainty begins over presence of Russian forces in Crimea
  - Limited domino effect northward into 2 other provinces & unrest in other cities
• Success begat success for Russia – diplomatic efforts used as opportunity & time
• Russian force presence and level of weaponry continued to increase
• Level of fighting increased to open warfare
• Environment set for the unexpected: “Oops factor”
Threat Assessment

MH-17 (AMS-KUL) 7/17/14

S-300 (Buk) / SA-11 Gadfly

Targeting: Radar Guided
Range: 3.4-20.5 km (3k+ Alt)
Max altitude: 25 km
Engine: Single Stage / Solid fuel

http://mirror.co.uk
http://www.military-today.com/missiles/buk.htm
Threat Assessment

High Level / Low Volume Threats – Other Examples

• Lebanon / Israel – June 2006
  – Zero warning; Air & Ground attack; OLBA primary target
• Arab Spring – Jan/Feb 2011
  – Unrest & violence grew as movement spread from Tunisia>Egypt>Libya>Syria
  – Upheaval continues today & is rewriting balance of power in MENA region
    • Primary factor in creating environment for ISIS to form & expand
Threat Assessment

What does this mean to us?

• Risk can increase due to incomplete, superficial or jaded information
• Threats evolve over time and can extend their reach beyond their borders
  – Boko Haram (Nigeria) & Multi-state conflict
  – ISIS actual or perceived affiliation outside of Syria/Iraq
• Vulnerability (TxV=R) can be affected unlike the threats
  – Knowledge = broadest method to decrease vulnerability
  – Remember the little things – they still matter in this big picture discussion
    • No flashy jewelry or money, no USA T-Shirts, Be selective in transportation options
• Deterrence is both a plan and a practice but is most importantly a mindset
DEDICATED TO HELPING BUSINESS ACHIEVE ITS HIGHEST GOALS.
Data Privacy & Flight Tracking

Tuesday, March 24, 2015 | 8:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

PRESENTED BY:
Gregory W. Kulis
Pilot & Security Coordinator: L Brands
Security Implications of Real Time Tracking

• When flight information is known, the ground transportation movements that follow also become more vulnerable.

• Security professionals recognize the ground transportation phase as the most vulnerable component of any travel.

• The real time tracking of private flight information enables those with malicious intent to target specific individuals for surveillance upon their arrival.
• Motive for surveillance of flight and ground transportation movements may be corporate espionage, criminal victimization, or terrorism.

• The security challenges are increased when the ground movement becomes predictable with real time tracking of the private aircraft arrival.
Blocked Aircraft Registration Program

- Following DOT efforts to dismantle the Blocked Registration Program the NBAA supported by industry comments were successful in legal efforts to allow blocking of real time aircraft tracking data.

- On August 21, 2013, the FAA issued a final notice in the Federal Register for the process of limiting the display of aircraft situation display to industry (ASDI) data. This was formerly known as the Blocked Aircraft Registration Request (BARR) program administered by NBAA.

- Detailed information on BARR Program registration can be found at: www.nbaa.org > Aircraft Operations > Security
Access to Aircraft Situation Display to Industry (ASDI)

- Two types of blocking requests –
- **FAA Source Blocking**
  - Using FAA Source Blocking, an operator’s ADSI data is not broadcast from the FAA to the ASDI vendors at all.

- **ASDI Subscriber Level Blocking**
  - Under ASDI Subscriber Level Blocking an operator’s flight tracking data is still broadcast from FAA to the ASDI providers (i.e. flight tracking vendors). However, the providers are bound by a letter of agreement to not publically display information for aircraft on the blocked list. This option allows operators to track their own aircraft through the ASDI vendor of their choice.

[http://www.nbaa.org/ops/security/asdi/#level-faa](http://www.nbaa.org/ops/security/asdi/#level-faa)
Current Challenges in Real Time Tracking ADS-B

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)

ADS-B Out transmits unencrypted real-time information about altitude, airspeed, and location derived through GPS from an equipped aircraft to ground stations and to other equipped aircraft.

The FAA has mandated that aircraft operating in airspace that now requires a Mode C transponder must be equipped with ADS-B Out by Jan. 1, 2020.

http://www.aopa.org/Advocacy/Air-Traffic-Services,-a,-Technology/Air-Traffic-Services-Brief-Automatic-Dependent-Surveillance-Broadcast-ADS-B
ADS-B transmits unencrypted tracking data directly from the aircraft

http://www.flightradar24.com/how-it-works
Flight tracking data service providers obtain data from multiple sources. FAA’s ASDI system and ADS-B out are both sources of real-time tracking information.

Blocked Aircraft Registration Requests that are submitted to the FAA are being honored by known service providers for all data sources.
Future of Blocked Data From ADS-B Data is Unknown

• As more aircraft are equipped with ADS-B out data, scanning equipment may become widely available.

• Avionics manufacturers may offer an encrypted version of ADS-B to provide additional security

• As Nextgen continues to advance, the NBAA continues to support ADS-B as we bring awareness to the privacy and security issues
NBAA Raises ADS-B Privacy Concerns with NextGen Advisory Committee

March 4, 2015

At a recent NextGen Advisory Committee meeting in Atlanta, held to discuss policy issues pertaining to the modernization of the nation's air traffic control system, NBAA President and CEO Ed Bolen expressed concern that Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) technology, a cornerstone of the FAA's satellite-based NextGen system, may not include needed protections for operators' privacy and security.
DEDICATED TO HELPING BUSINESS
ACHIEVE ITS HIGHEST GOALS.
Ebola Threat & Response

Tuesday, 24 March 2015 | 8:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m.

PRESENTED BY:
Tom Sloan – Director of Security Consulting
UnitedHealthcare Global Risk
Ebola threat and managed response

A 2014 Event

• “It’s becoming an outbreak almost impossible to contain and as Katie Simpson reports, there are desperate pleas to take Ebola seriously.” (CTV News)
Ebola threat and the managed response

A 2014 Event

- Kenya stopped taking any flights at all from affected countries
- Europe put in a broad ban
- US inbound considerations
Ebola threat and managed response

A 2014 Event

**Ebola is a threat to global security: column**

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa serves as a dramatic example of why it is essential that the United States take the lead in promoting a robust global health ...

**Largest ever Ebola outbreak is not a global threat ...**

[www.nature.com](http://www.nature.com) › … › News › Explainer › 2015 › March

Deadly Ebola probably touched down in Lagos, Nigeria, the largest city in Africa, on 20 July. A man who was thought to be infected with the virus had arrived there on ...
Ebola threat and managed response

A 2014 becomes a Non-event?

• Responsible News Coverage
  – Overstating the Viral event?
  – Contagion theory nourished Ebola paranoia?

• Did it ever get so bad that a ban on international travel was considered?
  – More lives at risk by DRIVING to the airport
  – In the US only two infections were contracted and both recovered
  – No further domestic infections

UHC/OSAC/WHO/CDC/Herald Tribune/The Atlantic
Ebola threat and managed response

2014 Non-event can provide lessons learned!

- HR, Legal, Risk management, Security, Travel and Aviation departments work together
- Policies and operational processes in place
- Flight departments stay abreast of international issues
- Though the threat subsided (similar to the Avian Flu and SARS events) don’t forsake crisis management preparation
Ebola threat and managed response

Response Plan Ingredients

• **Phase 1** Green alert: Non-contagion environment
• **Phase 2** Yellow alert: Increase in the global spread of the disease
• **Phase 3** Red alert: Direct threat to employees and operations

UnitedHealthcare/OSAC/WHO/CDC
DEDICATED TO HELPING BUSINESS ACHIEVE ITS HIGHEST GOALS.